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Upon assuming ofªce
in January 2009, President Barack Obama demanded a dramatic shift in U.S.
policy toward Afghanistan. Government corruption and lawlessness were
fueling the Taliban insurgency. State courts sought rents rather than justice.
Obama promised a new approach to halt the steadily deteriorating security sit-
uation, bolster the state’s failing legitimacy, and reverse the Taliban’s striking
resurgence. Promoting the rule of law and ending the justice vacuum would
be at the center of U.S. policy, along with military force.1 Advancing the rule of
law constituted a hallmark of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan.
The ofªcial policy declared, “Justice and rule of law programs will focus on
creating predictable and fair dispute resolution mechanisms to eliminate the
vacuum that the Taliban have exploited.”2 In one sense, the Obama adminis-
tration had identiªed a central truth: post-conºict state-building constitutes a
major domestic and international endeavor with profound transnational secu-
rity implications.3 Establishing a viable state justice sector is vital to the overall
success or failure of state-building efforts.4
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1. This article uses the concept of the rule of law in a “thin” rather than “thick” understanding.
See Randall Peerenboom, “Let One Hundred Flowers Bloom, One Hundred Schools Contend:
Debating Rule of Law in China,” Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 23, No. 3 (2002),
pp. 471–544. At minimum, as a “thin” concept, the rule of law requires that “law must be set forth
in advance (be prospective), be made public, be general, be clear, be stable and certain, and be ap-
plied to everyone.” See Brian Z. Tamanaha, “A Concise Guide to the Rule of Law,” St. John’s Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 07-0082 (New York: St. John’s University School of Law, 2007). Al-
though the term “thin” may suggest that this version of the rule of law is relatively simple to
achieve, institutionalizing a thin version after conºict constitutes a formidable, prolonged chal-
lenge. Thicker conceptualizations include extensive institutional, economic, cultural, and political
requirements unrealistic for most post-conºict states to aim for in the short to medium term. See
Robin L. West, Re-Imagining Justice: Progressive Interpretations of Formal Equality, Rights, and the Rule
of Law (Farnham, U.K.: Ashgate, 2003).
2. U.S. Mission Afghanistan, “U.S. Foreign Assistance for Afghanistan: Post Performance Manage-
ment Plan 2011–2015” (Kabul: U.S. Mission Afghanistan, 2010), p. 9.
3. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States,” Inter-
national Security, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Spring 2004), pp. 5–43, doi:10.1162/0162288041588296.
4. Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conºict (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004), pp. 205–206.
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In its approach to advancing the rule of law, however, the Obama adminis-
tration failed to understand the consequences of legal pluralism, in which
“two or more legal systems coexist in the same social ªeld.”5 There never was
a justice vacuum in Afghanistan.6 Nonstate justice, particularly the local com-
munity dispute-resolution mechanisms known as jirgas and shuras, main-
tained legal order in most of the country.7 Simultaneously, Taliban justice
began successfully asserting itself against the state in many places, not merely
ªlling a void.
The state-building endeavor in Afghanistan has constituted a major U.S. for-
eign policy and national security priority for more than a decade.8 The rebuild-
ing effort received an extraordinarily high level of international support. In
fact, the Afghan state depended on U.S. support to undertake even its most ba-
sic of functions, such as maintaining police, courts, and the military.9 In the jus-
tice sector, roughly 90 percent of funding came from foreign sources—most
notably, Western donor-states and international institutions such as the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).10 The Obama administra-
tion not only continued the George W. Bush administration’s efforts to bolster
Afghanistan’s state justice system, but dramatically increased funding to judi-
cial institutions. This funding increase ignored that similar initiatives had
achieved little in the past. Despite billions in spending, decades of experience
with post-conºict state-building, and a comprehensive review of the U.S. ap-
proach to Afghanistan, U.S. decisionmakers still failed to craft a policy re-
sponse that accurately conceptualized the complex legal landscape as well as
reºected the long-standing cultural and religious foundations of legitimate
state legal order.11 At the same time, U.S. policymakers rationalized or re-
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5. Sally Engle Merry, “Legal Pluralism,” Law & Society Review, Vol. 22, No. 5 (1988), pp. 869–896, at
p. 870, doi:10.2307/3053638.
6. Not all U.S. ofªcials and program implementers necessarily believed that there was a justice
vacuum, but it remained a consistent operating principle for policy.
7. Ali Wardak and John Braithwaite, “Crime and War in Afghanistan, Part II: A Jeffersonian Alter-
native?” British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 53, No. 2 (2013), pp. 197–214, doi:10.1093/bjc/azs066.
8. George W. Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (Washington,
D.C.: Execuitive Ofªce of the President, 2002); George W. Bush, “The National Security Strategy of
the United States of America” (Washington, D.C.: Executive Ofªce of the President, 2006); and
Barack Obama, “National Security Strategy” (Washington, D.C.: Executive Ofªce of the President,
2010).
9. U.S. Government Accountability Ofªce, “Afghanistan: Key Oversight Issues” (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability Ofªce, 2013), pp. 25–26.
10. Astri Suhrke and Kaja Borchgrevink, “Negotiating Justice Sector Reform in Afghanistan,”
Crime, Law, and Social Change, Vol. 51, No. 2 (2009), pp. 211–230, at p. 213.
11. I use “legitimate” in the sense of having achieved “normative acceptance and expectation by a
political community that the cluster of rules and institutions that compose the state ought to be
obeyed.” See Charles T. Call, “Ending Wars, Building States,” in Charles T. Call with Vanessa
Wyeth, eds., Building States to Build Peace (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2008), pp. 1–19, at p. 14.
mained in denial about the disinterest of Hamid Karzai’s regime in pro-
moting the rule of law.12 These decisions have had major consequences for
state-building in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s legal system continues to gain
ground even as the Obama administration has drawn to a close and Donald
Trump has taken ofªce.13 President Trump and the larger international com-
munity will be forced to grapple with the challenges posed by the conºict in
Afghanistan and by conºict-prone states worldwide, such as Libya, South
Sudan, and Syria.
This article argues that U.S. assistance to Afghanistan has done little to ad-
vance the rule of law in the country and, in certain instances, has been counter-
productive.14 It ªlls an important gap in the literature by examining major
U.S.-sponsored rule-of-law programs in Afghanistan and by analyzing the as-
sumptions and theories behind those programs.15 The article also offers in-
sights for current and future efforts to advance the rule of law after conºict
and investigates whether promoting the rule of law can offer a credible avenue
for counterinsurgency.
U.S. engagement from the intervention in late 2001 through to the election of
President Karzai’s successor in 2014 and the drawdown of international forces
in Afghanistan forms a compelling case study because the shortcomings of
U.S. efforts were real, not merely a product of the environment. Therefore, this
article looks at U.S. rule-of-law initiatives systematically over the arch of large-
scale U.S. engagement. It also surveys the Afghan justice sector holistically
through a focused, structured comparison of major U.S. rule-of-law program-
ming over time.16 The research presented here draws upon extensive primary
and secondary sources, as well as in-country ªeldwork conducted in 2009 and
2014 along with numerous telephone interviews. It examines U.S. engagement
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12. For example, see Sarah Chayes, The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan after the Taliban
(New York: Penguin, 2006); and Noah Coburn and Anna Larson, Derailing Democracy in Afghani-
stan: Elections in an Unstable Political Landscape (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014).
13. Azam Ahmed, “Taliban Justice Gains Favor as Ofªcial Afghan Courts Fail,” New York Times,
February 1, 2015.
14. This article deªnes “success” as having been achieved if individual programs or the overarch-
ing strategy has enhanced the prospects for developing and consolidating the rule of law. This cri-
terion follows the logic of Roland Paris’s work on international post-conºict state-building, which
examines whether state-building efforts have “enhanced the prospects for stable and lasting
peace.” See Paris, At War’s End, p. 55.
15. The broader international effort to promote the rule of law, however, has received a signiªcant
amount of scholarly attention. See Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Penguin, 2008); Thomas Barªeld, Afghanistan:
A Cultural and Political History (Princeton, N.Y.: Princeton University Press, 2010); Whit Mason, ed.,
The Rule of Law in Afghanistan: Missing in Inaction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011);
and Astri Suhrke, When More Is Less: The International Project in Afghanistan (London: Hurst, 2011).
16. Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sci-
ences (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005).
with Afghanistan’s state justice sector, which has received the bulk of scholarly
attention so far, but also with the nonstate legal systems that settle the vast
majority of legal disputes.17 Afghanistan constitutes a crucial test case for in-
ternational state-building efforts as well as a rich source of “lessons learned”
for policymakers.18
The article is divided into four major sections. The ªrst section examines the
complex, highly pluralistic legal landscape before and during U.S. judicial
state-building endeavors in Afghanistan. Although the state legal sector has
been the primary recipient of U.S. assistance, most disputes in the country
are still settled outside the state courts.19 Nonstate justice is essential for un-
derstanding the overarching structure of Afghanistan’s legal order. The second
section examines the major U.S. rule-of-law programs funded by the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of State, and
the Department of Defense from 2004 to 2014. The third section analyzes the
strategy, assumptions, and theory that underpinned U.S.-funded judicial state-
building projects. It argues that, examined comprehensively, U.S. efforts to ad-
vance the rule of law in Afghanistan during both the George W. Bush and
Barack Obama administrations failed to achieve meaningful progress because
their initiatives consistently reºected a deeply ºawed set of assumptions. The
fourth section examines the insights from U.S. efforts to promote rule of law
both for Afghanistan and for post-conºict judicial state-building more broadly.
It highlights the need for swift action after conºict, reforms to the U.S. assis-
tance oversight and implementation process, and policy approaches that ad-
dress the justice sector holistically and maintain an overarching commitment
to democracy and the rule of law.
A Crowded Legal Landscape
Afghanistan’s origin is conventionally dated to 1747. Judicial state-building
had formed a major state priority since the late nineteenth century, but state
power hinged upon relationships with religious and tribal authorities.20
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17. Ali Wardak, “Building a Post-War Justice System in Afghanistan,” Crime, Law, and Social
Change, Vol. 41, No. 4 (2004), pp. 319–341 doi:10.1023/B:CRIS.0000025765.73021.fa; and Thomas
Barªeld, Neamatollah Nojumi, and J. Alexander Their, “The Clash of Two Goods: State and Non-
State Dispute Resolution in Afghanistan” (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace,
2006).
18. Roland Paris, “Afghanistan: What Went Wrong?” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2013),
pp. 538–548, doi:10.1017/S1537592713000911.
19. Wardak and Braithwaite, “Crime and War in Afghanistan, Part II.”
20. Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973); and Barnett R.
Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2002).
The most effective form of legal order was not state law, but Pashtunwali,21
a nonstate legal code that continues to serve as both “an ideology and a
body of common law which has evolved its own sanctions and institutions.”
Historically, Pashtuns have implemented the legal code through jirgas, while
shuras perform a similar function for non-Pashtuns.22 All legitimate state-
sponsored legal orders in Afghan history have been grounded in a combina-
tion of state performance, Islam, and tribal approval. Slowly but surely, the
central government’s state-building made progress and the country enjoyed
domestic tranquility, albeit against a backdrop of low levels of economic devel-
opment, until a communist coup toppled the regime in 1978, plunging the
country into decades of civil strife under communist and then mujahideen
rule.23 Eventually the Taliban seized control. During the mid-1990s, the Taliban
imposed a harsh, but effective state legal order based on religious authority
with acquiescence from tribal justice authorities.24 Although the Taliban en-
joyed ªrm control domestically, foreign policy decisions proved the regime’s
undoing. Most notoriously, the Taliban regime harbored the perpetrators of the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States. Shortly there-
after, a major international effort in support of the Northern Alliance, a pre-
existing domestic military front that opposed the regime, toppled the Taliban
in late 2001.
The Afghan people were ready for a fresh start that promised law and order
coupled with democratic accountability.25 From the beginning, however, the
institutional arrangements of governance were not particularly conducive to
the rule of law. President Karzai and his allies stressed the importance of a
strong, independently elected executive to bring order, peace, and stability—
a vision institutionalized in the 2004 constitution. Establishing a presidential
system does not necessarily preclude democratization or development of a
state bound by the rule of law.26 Executed in accordance with the law and sub-
ject to legal and democratic accountability mechanisms, concentrated state au-
thority can “allow the community to deploy that power to enforce laws, keep
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21. For an overview of Pashtunwali’s core legal concepts, see Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 126; and Tom
Ginsburg, “An Economic Interpretation of the Pashtunwali,” University of Chicago Legal Forum,
No. 89 (2011), p. 104.
22. Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990), p. 35.
23. Larry P. Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the
Taliban (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001).
24. Abdulkader H. Sinno, Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 2008).
25. Barªeld, Afghanistan, pp. 300–318; and Rashid, Descent into Chaos.
26. Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart, “Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy:
A Critical Appraisal,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 4 (July 1997), pp. 449–471.
the peace, defend itself against outside enemies, and provide necessary public
goods.”27 Excessive consolidation of state power in one person, however, can
facilitate authoritarianism, undercut democratic pluralism, and circumvent le-
gal accountability.28
The international community, and particularly the United States, bears sig-
niªcant responsibility for these poor institutional choices. U.S. policymakers
strongly backed Karzai as Afghanistan’s interim leader and then president
based on the ºawed assumption that doing so would ensure stability and
smooth bilateral relations.29 They also agreed to deny any meaningful power
for provincial governors and allowed the president plenary power over their
appointment.30 U.S. decisionmakers acquiesced to Karzai’s selection of a con-
voluted and unrepresentative system for parliamentary elections that offered
strong disincentives for the creation of political parties, so vital for the rep-
resentation of diverse social groups in a democratic polity.31
After the Taliban’s collapse in late 2001, the state legal system was in
shambles. Although there was some progress in rebuilding the justice system’s
formal components, the Karzai regime, which was dominated by Northern
Alliance warlords, did not seek to institutionalize the rule of law. In contrast, it
behaved like a “vertically integrated criminal organization . . . whose core ac-
tivity was not in fact exercising the functions of a state but rather extracting re-
sources for personal gain.”32 The regime prevented rivals from seizing control
of the state and its lucrative patronage networks by bending the state’s pliant
institutions to serve its interests. In theory, state legal order was based on
codes and legislation, and rooted in the civil law tradition. The reality was
quite different. Although the constitution proclaimed judicial independence,
the courts were ªrmly under the executive’s control; highly susceptible to out-
side inºuences; and widely seen as corrupt, predatory, and rent seeking.33
The dismal performance of Afghanistan’s state courts bolstered the ap-
peal of nonstate justice systems.34 Hard data are rare, but it is estimated that
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27. Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Global-
ization of Democracy (London: Proªle, 2014), p. 24.
28. Juan J. Linz, “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?” in Linz
and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives, Vol. 1
(Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).
29. Suhrke, When More Is Less.
30. Barªeld, Afghanistan, pp. 297–299.
31. Andrew Reynolds, “The Curious Case of Afghanistan,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 17, No. 2
(April 2006), pp. 104–117.
32. Sarah Chayes, Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security (New York: W.W.
Norton, 2015), p. 62.
33. Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Art. 116.
34. Nonstate justice refers to entities not grounded in state authority that credibly structure behav-
ior and enjoy a signiªcant degree of autonomy from state law.
even after the collapse of the Taliban regime, 80 to 90 percent of legal disputes
were addressed by nonstate justice systems, most often rooted in tribal law.35
Most Afghans overwhelmingly preferred the nonstate justice offered by shuras
and jirgas over that meted out by the new regime.36 Nonstate actors derive
their authority largely from sources beyond the state, which often allows them
to maintain a signiªcant degree of autonomy.37 When powerful enough, as in
Afghanistan, they can function as state-building spoilers.38
Although jirgas and shuras remain the default dominant forms of dispute
resolution for many Afghans, tribal law codes, such as Pashtunwali, should
not be idealized. Pashtunwali remains a harsh system of justice with few hu-
man rights protections.39 Reºecting a long history of weak central rule, it relies
on the legal principle of self-help to remedy violations. Self-enforced remedies
for tribal law violations are notoriously difªcult to extract proportionately and
frequently spur further violence. Tribal law in Afghanistan is also system-
atically biased against women. As a matter of law, women are regulated
to an intrinsically subordinate position, and forced marriage can even be used
as compensation.40
The post-2001 era also saw challenges to the state legal order from war-
lords and the Taliban. Both the Bonn agreement, which outlined the parame-
ters of the post-conºict transition, and the political party law, which regulated
the structure of organized political competition, envisioned the disarmament
of warlords who had been largely suppressed by the Taliban. In reality, the
Karzai government and international forces relied on “pro-government or
more accurately ‘anti-Taliban’ warlords to maintain order at the local and re-
gional level.”41 In many cases, these were the same strongmen whose previous
rule had sparked such widespread anger that the Taliban became a compara-
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35. See Barªeld, Nojumi, and Their, “The Clash of Two Goods,” p. 9. Afghanistan is not an outlier.
In many developing and most post-conºict countries, nonstate justice systems often function as
the primary dispute resolution mechanisms, even as the state seeks to develop and assert the dom-
inance of the state legal system. See Peter Albrecht and Helene Maria Kyed, “Justice and Security:
When the State Isn’t the Main Provider” (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies,
2010).
36. Wardak and Braithwaite, “Crime and War in Afghanistan, Part II.”
37. Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the
Third World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988).
38. Ken Menkhaus, “Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and
the Politics of Coping,” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Winter 2006/07), pp. 74–106,
doi:10.1162/isec.2007.31.3.74.
39. Meghan Campbell and Geoffrey Swenson, “Legal Pluralism and Women’s Rights after
Conºict: The Role of CEDAW,” Columbia Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 1 (2016), pp. 112–
146.
40. Ginsburg, “An Economic Interpretation of the Pashtunwali,” p. 106.
41. Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (New York: W.W.
Norton, 2010), p. 130.
tively appealing alternative in the 1990s. Under the post-2001 regime, warlords
reemerged and focused on structuring the political and legal order in their
areas.42 Shortly thereafter, a network of warlords became a long-term, destruc-
tive ªxture of the Afghan political scene.43
Despite losing power in 2001, the reconstituted Taliban quickly established
itself as the state’s ªercest judicial rival as early as 2003. Taliban justice became
a centerpiece of a full-blown insurgency by 2006.44 Effective legal order consti-
tuted the core of the Taliban’s political program, underpinned their claim to be
Afghanistan’s legitimate rulers, and highlighted the state justice system’s fail-
ures. Taliban insurgents actively contended with the state legal system, espe-
cially outside the capital. The Taliban operated “a parallel legal system that is
acknowledged by local communities as being legitimate, fair, free of bribery,
swift, and enduring.”45 Moreover, their justice system was “easily one of the
most popular and respected elements of the Taliban insurgency by local com-
munities, especially in southern Afghanistan.”46 Taliban justice sought to pro-
vide what the state justice system did not: predictable, effective, legitimate,
and accessible dispute resolution.
In short, U.S. efforts to promote the rule of law in Afghanistan never oc-
curred in a justice vacuum but rather in an ever-more crowded, highly con-
tested and violent space. Efforts to promote the rule of law would have to
convince a skeptical population, engage with entrenched tribal justice mecha-
nisms, and ultimately defeat armed actors overseeing a parallel legal system.
Although certainly not impossible, this task represented a serious challenge.
The U.S. policy response, however, was strikingly simplistic.
Promoting the Rule of Law in Practice
The United States espoused an interest in advancing the rule of law in
Afghanistan, but this goal was secondary to bolstering the Karzai regime,
which lacked a commitment to either democracy or the rule of law. Karzai’s
administration prioritized retaining power, collecting rents, and exercising au-
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42. Autonomy should not be confused with isolation. Warlords, such as Atta Mohammad Noor in
Balkh, Gul Agha Sherzai in Nangarhar, and Ismail Khan in Herat frequently engage the state and
even hold state posts when it suits their interests. See Dipali Mukhopadhyay, Warlords, Strongman
Governors, and the State in Afghanistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
43. Kimberly Marten, “Warlordism in Comparative Perspective,” International Security, Vol. 31,
No. 3 (Winter 2006/07), pp. 41–73, doi:10.1162/isec.2007.31.3.41.
44. Antonio Giustozzi and Adam Baczko, “The Politics of the Taliban’s Shadow Judiciary, 2003–
2013,” Central Asian Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2014), pp. 199–224, doi:10.1163/22142290-00102003.
45. Thomas H. Johnson, “Taliban Adaptations and Innovations,” Small Wars & Insurgencies,
Vol. 24, No. 1 (2013), p. 9.
46. Ibid.
thority unconstrained by legal requirements.47 U.S. policymakers were so fear-
ful that the Taliban might return to power that they were not prepared to
meaningfully challenge the regime’s increasingly anti-democratic tendencies,
corruption, and lawlessness.
Paradoxically, despite the justice sector’s extreme dependence on foreign
aid, international actors’ ability to promote the rule of law in Afghanistan was
heavily circumscribed. In theory, aid dependence should increase the state’s
reliance on continued aid ºows and, therefore, on donors. This dynamic
would seem to provide major donors with meaningful inºuence over the re-
cipient state’s decisions and actions. Donors, however, dislike being seen as
dictating state behavior.48 Program implementers in Afghanistan faced struc-
tural constraints that hindered their ability to promote the rule of law. Donors
assess implementers based on their ability to execute stipulated programming
deliverables, which almost always involves working with state institutions.
This dynamic demands state consent regardless of whether ofªcials are com-
mitted to programmatic principles. Programs that fail to execute are viewed
poorly by donors and endanger future contracts.49 Program implementers
have strong incentives to collaborate with deeply corrupt state institutions,
provided their leaders are willing to at least pay lip service to rule-of-law ide-
als. These problems were compounded in Afghanistan by its steadily deterio-
rating security situation, which limited the areas and types of work that could
be done at an acceptable level of risk.
Even when Italy was technically the justice sector’s “lead nation” from
2002 to 2006, the United States was the most inºuential international ac-
tor.50 As is shown below, the United States funded a multitude of major in-
itiatives through USAID, the State Department, and later the Defense
Department totaling more than $1 billion on more than sixty programs.51 Not
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litical Economy of Transnational Action,” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Summer 2002),
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51. All ªgures for comprehensive program costs were taken from SIGAR, “SIGAR 15-68 Audit Re-
dissimilar to the broader U.S. engagement in Afghanistan, each agency pur-
sued its own programmatic priorities that were not necessarily coordinated
with other agencies’ goals or even broadly consistent.52
usaid afghanistan rule-of-law project, 2004–09
USAID became the ªrst major provider of rule-of-law assistance with the cre-
ation of the $44 million Afghanistan Rule-of Law (AROLP) program. Checchi
Consulting operated AROLP from October 2004 to July 2009. The initiative
focused on (1) “strengthening court systems and the education of legal person-
nel,” (2) reforming the legislature, (3) improving access to justice, and (4) even-
tually engaging with the informal sector. Reform of the commercial court as
well as the promotion of human rights and women’s rights under Islam also
received priority.53 Capacity building formed the cornerstone of programming.
The program instructed more than 1,000 judges as well as approximately 60
law professors and 100 university administrators.54 AROLP produced legal
materials and sought to improve the courts’ administrative capacities. As with
the vast majority of rule-of-law assistance, it was highly technocratic and state-
centric. In its later years, as state-focused initiatives were already beginning
to fall short of expectations, AROLP displayed some interest in the nonstate
justice sector. Programmers believed that “the linkage between the formal
and informal justice sectors [was] essential to improving the rule of law in
Afghanistan.”55 AROLP sponsored research on nonstate justice and tried to in-
crease citizens’ awareness of the state justice system, along with “their legal
rights and responsibilities under the Constitution of Afghanistan.”56 The pro-
gram also advocated for “a national policy on state relations with informal jus-
tice mechanisms.”57
While AROLP worked with various justice-sector institutions, the Supreme
Court was its most important partner. The Supreme Court’s consent was es-
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sential for most programming, but the judiciary was not independent in prac-
tice.58 As a result, Supreme Court judges had little incentive or ability to foster
the rule of law, particularly if it involved challenging executive power. The
Supreme Court consistently upheld executive authority regardless of how
dubious the exercise of that power, including in conºicts over the scope of ex-
ecutive power, election administration, and the removal of presidential ap-
pointees.59 AROLP did little to address structural problems in the Afghan
justice sector or constructively engage the nonstate sector. This dynamic is evi-
dent based on the program’s chosen evaluation criteria: (1) creation of a “na-
tional policy on the informal justice sector” and (2) usage of state courts as
reºected in survey results.60 A nonstate justice policy was developed by do-
mestic and international actors, marking the ªrst ofªcial recognition of non-
state justice authorities. Despite formal agreement at the ministerial level, the
policy did not reºect a real consensus because it relied on ambiguous language
to paper over major differences and did not involve any serious engagement
with nonstate judicial actors.
The second evaluation criterion was equally problematic. First, projects
were predicated on the simplistic and inaccurate belief common to rule-of-law
programs that informing people about the state courts and their rights will im-
prove the rule of law.61 Second, the program sought to channel people to state
courts regardless of the consequences. Courts were initially underresourced,
both ªnancially and in terms of human resources. They were also slow, expen-
sive, and possessed limited enforcement capacity. Worse, they were often cor-
rupt, predatory, and rent seeking.62 It made little sense to direct cases into the
state justice system regardless of the quality and capacity of its courts. As
the ªrst major USAID rule-of-law program, AROLP did next to nothing to ad-
vance the rule of law.
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usaid rule-of-law successor programs, 2010–14
By 2009, promoting a just, viable legal order was increasingly seen as a potent
weapon in the ªght against an increasingly powerful Taliban insurgency that
drew strength from the Afghan government’s unwillingness to address the
state’s immense corruption.63 USAID funded two related rule-of-law pro-
grams. Rule of Law Stabilization–Formal Component (RLS-Formal) sought to
“develop[] a justice system that is both effective and enjoys wide respect
among Afghan citizens is critical to stabilizing democracy and bringing peace
to the country.”64 Rule of Law Stabilization–Informal Component (RLS-
Informal) shared a similar premise, as it aimed “to ‘promote and support
the informal justice system in key post-conºict areas’ as a way of improv-
ing stabilization.”65
rls-formal. The international development contractor Tetra Tech DPK
was chosen to implement RLS-Formal from May 2010 to September 2014, at a
cost of more than $47.5 million. The program’s goals were strikingly similar
to those of AROLP. RLS-Formal emphasized “capacity building” of judicial
actors and administrators, as well as improving legal education and raising
“public legal capacity and awareness.”66 RLS-Formal supported extensive
training and technical assistance programs, along with the development of
educational materials and strategic plans. There were also public informa-
tion campaigns and attempts to strengthen the public outreach capacity
of the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice. Most participants viewed the
trainings positively,67 but RLS-Formal faced chronic difªculties. The program
emphasized “[improving] the public image and use of the formal judiciary,”68
but improving public perception risked enabling rent seeking. RLS-Formal ig-
nored structural issues with the underlying political economy of the Afghan
justice system, including the lack of judicial independence and endemic cor-
ruption. As before, public service announcements encouraging more people to
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use a highly corrupt justice system did little to improve the rule of law and
threatened to further undermine Afghans’ faith in the judicial system.
Programming, again, depended on consent from the institutional actors re-
sponsible for many of these problems. These actors had little incentive to facili-
tate changes that threatened the larger political and legal order. Tetra Tech’s
ªnal report is strikingly forthright in this regard. After noting major challenges
with corruption and “weak political support for rule of law reforms,” the
report explains: “The most difªcult barriers to overcome during project imple-
mentation, and the barriers that threaten the sustainability of project initia-
tives, are a lack of willingness among counterpart institutions to support and
adopt reforms, and a failure to allocate sufªcient funds to maintain quality
trainings for current and future justice-sector personnel. Leadership at coun-
terpart institutions continues to demonstrate a lack of commitment to justice
sector reforms by delaying the approval of tools and technologies that will in-
crease the efªciency and transparency of courts.”69
The Supreme Court was particularly problematic because it received and
oversaw external aid but lacked a commitment to the rule of law. Tetra Tech
observed that frequently, “when the Supreme Court was asked to approve
new initiatives or reforms, the institution tended to make approval contingent
on future events that never happened.”70 It determined that the Supreme
Court’s attitude reºected a clear “reluctance to embrace new processes and
procedures that increase the efªciency, transparency, accountability, and fair-
ness in the justice sector.”71 Thus, RLS-Formal initiatives had little prospect for
sustainability or fostering meaningful institutional change.
Although Tetra Tech implemented the program, USAID deserves the most
strident criticism. It designed the program and continually displayed almost
willful blindness to political reality. As the Ofªce of the Special Inspector
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) notes, “USAID nearly dou-
bled funding, even though it knew the Afghan Supreme Court was not inter-
ested in funding or otherwise sustaining those activities.”72 Programming
never meaningfully engaged with the long-standing pillars of legitimacy in
Afghanistan: religion, cultural norms, and provision of public goods. Instead,
the focus was on public relations. RLS-Formal sought to improve the judi-
ciary’s image based on the mistaken idea that the potential users lacked
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sufªcient information about state courts, but Afghans already recognized
that courts were not credible dispute resolution forums. Neither judicial per-
formance nor public perception of the judiciary improved.73 Avoidance of
the courts was entirely rational. Even if the quality of justice had im-
proved through training or administrative reform, nothing in the program ad-
dressed the judicial system’s inability to enforce its judgments or prevent
outside interference.
rls-informal. By 2010, policymakers increasingly viewed nonstate justice
as a more productive avenue for international engagement. This belief was
the animating idea behind RLS-Informal. The nearly $40 million Checchi-
administered RLS-Informal program operated from 2010 to 2014. RLS-
Informal emphasized “access to fair, transparent, and accountable justice for
men, women, and children by (1) improving and strengthening the traditional
dispute resolution system, (2) bolstering collaboration between the informal
and formal justice systems, and (3) supporting cooperation for the resolution
of longstanding disputes.”74 It sought to improve the quality of nonstate jus-
tice and to strengthen linkages between the state and nonstate justice systems.
The program’s more pressing goal, however, was to supplement and consoli-
date U.S.-led counterinsurgency efforts. RLS-Informal envisioned ªlling the
supposed “justice vacuum” in territories that had “been ‘cleared and held’ by
the military and the Taliban ‘courts’ removed.”75 Localized nonstate justice
mechanisms were to be strengthened, or in some instances created, to prevent
“‘teetering’ areas from reverting back to Taliban justice and inºuence.”76 RLS-
Informal engaged with nonstate judicial actors in targeted areas. Yet, the pro-
gram largely echoed work done for state actors and drew on the same highly
suspect template. Capacity building was a major focus for elders and other
informal-justice actors. Trainings addressed state and Sharia law as well as ad-
ministrative processes. Beyond training, RLS-Informal sought to “encourag[e]
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women’s participation in TDR [traditional dispute resolution] processes, im-
plement[] a program of public outreach, and build[] networks of elders.”77
RLS-Informal attempted to engage with the long-standing pillars of legal le-
gitimacy by working within the tribal system. It sought to capitalize on the
perceived desire of many local actors to increase their social standing.78 From
the donors’ perspective, this dynamic could allow them to more effectively
provide order. The external evaluation does identify some modest changes in
response to outside assistance,79 but local justice actors certainly did not
change their approach to state justice. Although RLS-Informal sought to in-
crease linkages between state and nonstate justice, the ºow was one direc-
tional. More cases were referred to the nonstate system, but referrals to state
courts did not increase.80 This dynamic reºects Afghans’ continued low regard
for state courts.
Strengthening nonstate justice raised even more logistical issues than
strengthening the state system. A judge may be corrupt or unwilling to engage
program implementers, but at least it is clear who is and is not a judge. When
engaging tribal or religious authorities, participant selection was an inherently
fraught process. Program staff genuinely attempted to understand each local-
ity. Nevertheless, grasping local dynamics and how international assistance
would subsequently inºuence communal relations far exceeded their technical
capacity. Although reports cast local participants as motivated solely by a de-
sire to help the broader community, often they were more motivated by the
ability of international assistance to enhance their inºuence.81 Equally trou-
bling, the program lacked a clear, coherent approach for navigating the
tensions between state law, including international human rights norms, and
Sharia law. Program decisions were inevitably somewhat ad hoc and based on
short-term calculations. While RLS-Informal reºected some knowledge of
local realities, insurgents almost invariably knew areas better. International in-
tervention occasionally even made local tensions worse and resolution of long-
standing disputes more difªcult.82
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Counterinsurgency was the U.S. government’s top priority. RLS-Informal
envisioned strengthening the nonstate justice sector to undercut the Taliban’s
justice system. Simple enough in theory, but it proved deeply challenging and
often counterproductive. First, RLS-Informal laid the groundwork for counter-
insurgency efforts on the shaky foundation of the local authorities most will-
ing to collaborate with the United States rather than the most inºuential
religious and tribal authorities. Therefore, program achievements inherently
depended on outside support and quickly evaporated once that support was
gone. Second, RLS-Informal’s short-term approach generated pressure for
quick wins and demonstrable metrics, but even these were often in short sup-
ply.83 Third, the approach incorrectly assumed the existence of a justice
vacuum in which new dispute-resolution efforts could thrive. If there were
truly a void, then RLS-Informal’s efforts to strengthen or create new nonstate
dispute resolution mechanisms would have made sense. In reality, tribal
structure, warlords, or the Taliban underpinned order at the local level. RLS-
Informal’s favored local representatives were often not the most prominent
community members. Whatever authority these individuals had largely re-
ºected international assistance rather than local standing. Shuras set up by in-
ternational actors could be destabilizing by distributing large amounts of
external funding as well as empowering individuals through military force
who may not have enjoyed substantial popular support. Interviewers who
worked on internationally funded nonstate justice programs even suggested
that some individuals with access to international support used aid and the
threat of U.S. military force to pursue personal agendas and vendettas.84
RLS-Informal failed to understand that providing an alternative justice
venue alone was insufªcient to counter the Taliban. In many cases, Taliban jus-
tice was comparatively well regarded, particularly in the Pashtun heartland.85
The Taliban actively sought to prevent local communities from using state
courts or U.S.-backed dispute resolution forums. Taliban issued “night letters”
threatening to kill all individuals and the entire families of those who collabo-
rated with the international programs or the Afghan government. Where vil-
lages were under the protection of international military forces, the Taliban
promised to retaliate once those troops left.86 RLS-Informal could not counter
the Taliban’s credible threats of immediate and long-term violence.
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usaid initiatives: implementation versus program design
Thus far, this section has criticized justice-sector program implementation in
Afghanistan, but this issue highlights more fundamental problems with
USAID management and oversight. Invariably, USAID sought to control the
scope and content of its projects as well as their implementation. This ten-
dency to micromanage was reºected in contracts that “specif[ied] precisely
what the U.S. contracting partners are to do at every step of the way through-
out a project.”87 The level of centralized control in the Afghanistan contracts
was stunning, particularly given the ºuidity of the situation and the need for a
nuanced, localized approach when trying to engage local communities. In ad-
dition to USAID’s inherent contractual power to modify programming, Tetra
Tech and Checchi were required to submit elaborate performance-monitoring
plans for approval. USAID’s drive toward ever-greater quantiªcation and con-
trol stemmed largely from the need to establish to the U.S. Congress exactly
how funding was spent and what had been achieved. Yet USAID’s in-house
capacities had been largely “hollowed out.”88 This vicious cycle was particu-
larly evident in Afghanistan, because the extensive demands of contracting
generated a general shortage of qualiªed applicants.
justice sector support program, 2005–14
The U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (INL) served as the lead agency tasked with coordinating
U.S. rule-of-law assistance in Afghanistan. Largely implemented by Paciªc
Architects and Engineers, the State Department’s Justice Sector Support
Program (JSSP) was the “primary capacity building vehicle” for judicial state-
building.89 The JSSP reºected grand ambitions with $241 million in expendi-
tures from 2005 to 2014. It was the largest single rule-of-law program in
Afghanistan. JSSP featured three major components. Component one focused
on trainings for regional justice-sector ofªcials, such as judges, prosecutors,
and defense attorneys. Component two concentrated on establishing a case-
management system. The third component emphasized building the adminis-
trative and technical capacity of relevant ministries.90
The JSSP offered training, capacity building, and technical assistance to the
Attorney General’s Ofªce, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Women’s
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Affairs, the Interior Ministry, the Independent National Legal Training Center,
and the Supreme Court. Staff numbers were signiªcant. In 2011, for example,
the JSSP employed “93 Afghan legal experts, 65 American advisors, and over
100 Afghan support staff.”91 Training was undertaken on a massive scale, with
“a grand total of over 300 JSSP courses training over 13,500 students.”92
Training occurred in all thirty-four provinces for judges, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and other legal personnel. By the end of 2014, the JSSP had devel-
oped and implemented a comprehensive case-management system active in
eighteen provinces, featuring data on 104,000 cases.93 The program provided
assistance with legislative drafting and law implementation. It also created
new institutions—notably, the Attorney General’s Anti-Corruption Unit, the
Afghanistan Independent Bar Association, and the Ministry of Justice’s
Planning Directorate.
Despite the JSSP’s broad reach and substantial funding, at its core the JSSP
was a straightforward judicial capacity-building program that invested
heavily in the state justice sector. Although larger in scope, both the means and
the ends of the JSSP were strikingly similar to those of USAID’s AROLP
and RLS-Formal programs. In terms of results, comprehensive audits of the
JSSP have shown no demonstrable evidence that the program advanced
the rule of law or even met its own programmatic objectives.94 Despite exten-
sive training, no key justice-sector institutions displayed a meaningful com-
mitment to uniform application of the law or a willingness to follow it. New
laws were passed but were not consistently enforced. All major justice-sector
institutions remained ªrmly under the control of “one of the most corrupt re-
gimes on the planet.”95 The State Department cast the Afghan state’s failure to
address corruption as a failure of “political will,” rather recognizing that
corruption was intrinsic to the system. The JSSP consistently faced major man-
agement, oversight, and implementation issues, including a series of “poorly
designed deliverables,” which in turn led to the actual deliverables produced
being “useless.”96
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rule-of-law ªeld force–afghanistan, 2010–14
The U.S. military became directly involved in efforts to promote the rule
of law in Afghanistan through the Rule of Law Field Force–Afghanistan
(ROLFF-A) initiative under the auspices of the Combined Joint Interagency
Task Force–435. ROLFF-A operated from September 2010 to February 2014.
The Department of Defense spent approximately $24 million subsidizing the
state justice sector. ROLFF-A sought to “provide essential ªeld capabilities and
security to Afghan, coalition and civil-military rule of law project teams in
non-permissive areas, in order to build Afghan criminal justice capacity and
promote the legitimacy of the Afghan government.”97 The program sought to
(1) enhance human resources, (2) construct justice infrastructure, (3) increase
public awareness and access to state courts, and (4) improve physical security
for judges and other judicial actors in ten provinces.98
Apart from the fourth priority, ROLFF-A’s objectives were decidedly con-
ventional. ROLFF-A attempted to strengthen the state justice system by work-
ing primarily with the Supreme Court, the Ministries of Justice and of the
Interior, and the High Ofªce of Oversight for Anti-Corruption. The program
proclaimed neutrality regarding nonstate justice, “provided that dispute reso-
lution is not administered by the Taliban or other insurgent groups.”99 Al-
though the national government had yet to formalize its relationship with
nonstate justice actors, the program sought to engage “Afghan Justice Sector
actors to build linkages between the two systems.”100
ROLFF-A was fully integrated within larger stability and counterinsurgency
efforts in Afghanistan that stressed that “establishing the rule of law is a key
goal and end state.”101 As the program’s commander, Brig. Gen. Mark Martins,
explained, ROLFF-A sought to “establish rule-of-law green zones.”102 Over
time a “hub-and-spoke linkage between green zones in key provinces and
districts” would emerge, which in turn would help “create a system of justice
at the subnational level.”103 In other words, the rule of law was conceptualized
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as a cornerstone of broader efforts to build the state from the bottom up, while
failing to acknowledge just how ambitious, optimistic, and ahistorical this be-
lief was. After all, why would nonstate actors suddenly embrace the state legal
system that showed no sign of improving and at the cost of potential insurgent
retaliation? The U.S. military interventions never grappled with the fact that a
hub-and-spoke system made little sense if the state justice sector failed to si-
multaneously improve. Furthermore, as the rule of law takes decades to estab-
lish even under favorable circumstances, it was naïve to believe that it could be
instituted through a short-term surge in forces.104
ROLFF-A faced a multitude of serious issues. Its programming incorrectly
assumed that stabilization and rule-of-law programming were functional
equivalents. As with the RLS-Informal initiative, ROLFF-A sought to build sta-
bility on quick wins and demonstrable outputs to ªll a nonexistent justice
vacuum. The program’s approach was at odds with a legal landscape deªned
by ongoing, ªerce combat, and its achievements remain speculative. The
Defense Department still does not know how much money was spent.105
Ironically for a military initiative, insecurity undermined the program. U.S.
military forces generally could not protect against Taliban attacks in the short
term, let alone once programming ceased. The mere presence of the military
could incite violence as local actors scrambled to acquire external resources.
The overt militarization of rule-of-law assistance and its counterinsurgent
use in Afghanistan generated additional problems. First, the assumptions un-
derpinning counterinsurgency operations were dubious. As Paul Fishstein and
Andrew Wilder have written, there is a “surprisingly weak evidence base for
the effectiveness of aid in promoting stabilization and security objectives” in
Afghanistan and more generally.106 The strategy reºected a unilateral decision
by U.S. policymakers rather than a cooperative strategy with the Afghan re-
gime.107 Afghan government ofªcials desired military support to defeat the
Taliban but were decidedly disinterested in furthering legal reform.
Rule of Law in Afghanistan 133
104. Douglass Cecil North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast, Violence and Social Orders:
A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2009); and Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power,
Prosperity, and Poverty (London: Proªle, 2012).
105. SIGAR, “SIGAR 15-68 Audit Report.”
106. Edwina Thompson, “Winning ‘Hearts and Minds’ in Afghanistan: Assessing the Effective-
ness of Development Aid in COIN Operations,” paper presented at the Wilton Park Conference,
Wilton Park, United Kingdom, March 11–October 14, 2010, p. 1; and Jan Rasmus Böhnke and
Christoph Zürcher, “Aid, Minds, and Hearts: The Impact of Aid in Conºict Zones,” Conºict Man-
agement and Peace Science, Vol. 30, No. 5 (2013), pp. 411–432.
107. Paul Fishstein and Andrew Wilder, “Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship
between Aid and Security in Afghanistan” (Medford, Mass.: Feinstein International Center, Tufts
University, 2012).
Second, the program reºected some notable misunderstandings and mis-
perceptions. The Defense Department consistently stressed that the nonstate
actors it engaged were authentic, traditional, and organic. In reality, “authority
over life and death was simultaneously located in other institutions and actors,
namely external interveners,” rather than nonstate justice actors, who largely
depended on external forces for their authority.108 Moreover, the enforcement
of “rule-of-law green zones” within a hub-and-spoke system relied on the
prospect of external force. State courts had little ability to implement their rul-
ings. Even more troubling, the thoroughly corrupt, deeply compromised state
judicial institutions could not provide stability. Even if all areas were cleared
and every insurgent defeated, the state would still lack a legitimate legal order.
There was no hub to build spokes around. ROLFF-A starkly highlights exter-
nal actors’ limited capacity to advance the rule of law even when it is overtly
backed by military force. Even in the best of circumstances, establishing the
rule of law takes time. Thus, a rule-of-law green zone means little unless it ex-
ists for years and is linked to powerful domestic constituencies committed to
the rule of law.
programmatic progress and challenges
Although the programs detailed above achieved a few tactical gains and
helped build some state judicial infrastructure, no U.S. program meaningfully
advanced the rule of law in Afghanistan. Each faced signiªcant challenges in a
complex, legally pluralist environment with serious security concerns. The
biggest problem, however, was that key state actors were not committed to
the rule of law, and there was little real demand for U.S. assistance. Without
high-level state efforts to reduce corruption, improve judicial performance,
and engage constructively with nonstate tribal and religious actors, judicial
state-building assistance would always achieve little regardless of expenditure
or program design. Indeed, when efforts were made to “investigat[e] corrup-
tion, they were rebuked by Karzai’s ofªcials for misunderstanding the nature
of patronage networks that served to support the government.”109 Yet,
U.S. policymakers chose to keep investing in efforts they knew were not work-
ing. Policymakers, donors, and implementers embraced wildly optimistic as-
sumptions to rationalize the perpetuation of failing programs and policies.
U.S. decisionmakers made clear policy and programmatic choices that had
profound consequences.
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Conceptualizing International Judicial State-Building in Afghanistan
When the Taliban regime collapsed, Afghanistan’s legal system displayed a
high degree of legal pluralism. Yet, most disputes were still settled based on
tribal codes. Initial security arrangements outside the capital were predi-
cated on alliances between the state and armed strongmen. U.S. assistance
reºected the optimistic and ultimately unrealistic idea that these tacit alli-
ances would become less necessary as state courts gained capacity and
authority. While aid focused on bolstering state justice-sector institutions
for more than half a decade during the Bush administration, Obama admin-
istration policymakers subsequently determined that subsidization alone
was insufªcient.
In 2009, the United States’ policy rhetoric regarding Afghanistan’s legal sys-
tem began to shift, but its initiatives remained focused around a litany of
highly repetitive trainings and capacity-building projects. Policy reºected a
combination of political expediency and security concerns that bore little re-
semblance to the grandiose claims about ensuring the rule of law and promot-
ing access to justice for ordinary Afghans. The United States consistently
revamped its ofªcial approach. Still, as highlighted above, improvement al-
ways remained elusive. Yet while programs were problematic, the overarching
issue was strategy and the attempt to build the rule of law in partnership with
a regime that was certainly interested in passing regulations for society at large
but had no interest in being bound by the law itself, ending impunity, or pro-
moting the rule of law. After all, writes Jane Stromseth “even the most formal,
minimalist conception of the rule of law requires a normative commitment
to the project of the rule of law” by state ofªcials at the highest level.110
strategies for addressing the nonstate justice sector
The previous section highlighted the most important programmatic initiatives
undertaken with a goal of advancing the rule of law in Afghanistan. This sec-
tion focuses on the overarching strategies employed by U.S. policymakers to
further this objective. Even if unstated, there are ªve main strategies for con-
ceptualizing engagement between the state and nonstate systems in highly
legally pluralist settings such as Afghanistan: (1) bridging, (2) harmonization,
(3) incorporation, (4) subsidization, and (5) repression. These strategies are
conceptually distinct though by no means mutually exclusive or hermetically
sealed in practice.
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Success can never be guaranteed by strategy alone, but certain environments
favor certain strategies. Bridging approaches aim to allocate cases between the
state and nonstate justice systems as appropriate given relevant state law and
participant preferences. Harmonization seeks to transform nonstate justice
principles and outputs to be consistent with the state system’s professed core
values in key areas—most frequently, nonstate actors’ treatment of women.111
Under incorporation, nonstate justice becomes state justice as those venues are
placed under the authority of state actors. Incorporation can take the form of
religious or customary courts or the designation of nonstate justice actors as
courts of ªrst instance. Alternatively, decisions from the nonstate system could
be tentative, subject to appeal or ratiªcation by state ofªcials. Subsidization,
which can take a variety of forms, seeks to increase the capacity, performance,
and popularity of state justice. Certain core techniques, nevertheless, recur
across settings—most notably, legislative reform, capacity building, physical
infrastructure construction, supporting symbolic representation, and increased
public engagement. In contrast, repression aims to eliminate the state’s judicial
rivals. When the state is strong enough, this can take the form of simply
prohibiting nonstate justice forums. Almost invariably, however, repression
entails signiªcant violence. Repression can be essential when the state faces
an existential threat from nonstate justice actors, particularly when linked
to an armed insurgency, but it is invariably fraught with risks of recipro-
cal violence.
subsidization strategy, 2002–08
Once U.S. rule-of-law promotion efforts in Afghanistan began in earnest in
2004, they focused overwhelmingly on subsidization. The vast majority of the
country’s judicial infrastructure had been destroyed during the conºict.
Qualiªed legal professionals were scarce, and their training needs were daunt-
ing.112 International assistance was a prerequisite for enabling most justice-
sector organizations to function at all. Subsidization thus reºected a clear,
compelling rationale: the state justice sector desperately needed improved hu-
man resources, training, supplies, and infrastructure. International aid was fo-
cused on building modern state institutions that acted in accordance with the
rule of law. The subsidization approach was deeply embedded in nearly all ju-
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dicial state-building efforts. The 2005–10 USAID–Afghanistan Mission’s strate-
gic objectives explicitly endorsed subsidization. It focused upon “build[ing]
capacity of the formal justice sector” by (1) “decreas[ing] obstacles to citizens
accessing the formal justice sector”; (2) “increas[ing] professionalism of judi-
cial sector personnel”; and (3) “strengthen[ing] the institutional capacity for
lawmaking and technical drafting.”113
The initial international efforts faced substantial criticism for allocating
insufªcient resources to state reconstruction.114 Yet, Afghanistan received an
immense amount of support relative to other contemporary peacebuilding
missions, and its aid absorptive capacity was limited.115 Merely increasing as-
sistance does not guarantee improvement and often produces signiªcant prob-
lems. As discussed earlier, the rule of law takes decades to establish, and there
is no area where more rule-of-law assistance would have clearly translated
into better justice or a state more committed to the rule of law.
Subsidization achieved little given its slow start, state disinterest, and poor
strategic choices. These choices included failing to establish nationwide secu-
rity during a period of relative calm, outsourcing security to warlords, and al-
lowing consolidation of authority in the executive and a culture of corruption
to ºourish.116 State ofªcials generally cared little for U.S.-backed legal modern-
ization plans. Moreover, the programmatic initiatives were decidedly un-
inspired. As Thomas Carothers has observed, assistance to Afghanistan
exempliªed a “breathtakingly mechanistic approach to rule-of-law develop-
ment” focused on replicating “institutional endpoints”—an approach that has
been widely discredited.117 The pattern described by Carothers neatly captures
Afghanistan’s situation, where programmers assessed “in what ways selected
institutions do not resemble their counterparts in countries that donors be-
lieve embody successful rule of law—and then attempting to modify or re-
shape those institutions to ªt the desired model. If a court lacks access to legal
materials, then those legal materials should be provided. If case management
in the courts is dysfunctional, it should be brought up to Western standards. If
a criminal procedure law lacks adequate protections for detainees, it should
be rewritten. The basic idea is that if the institutions can be changed to ªt the
models, the rule of law will emerge.”118 Outside investments in the state jus-
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tice sector, however, produced no discernible progress toward furthering the
rule of law in Afghanistan.
In 2006, international actors began to express growing interest in
Afghanistan’s nonstate justice sector. Policy suggestions included bridging
through the creation of mutually constitutive institutional links between state
and nonstate dispute resolution mechanisms, harmonization through attempts
to ensure that nonstate dispute resolution forums act in a manner consistent
with state law, and incorporation efforts to establish some sort of overarch-
ing system where jirgas and shuras would function akin to courts of ªrst
instance.119 Although it was a growing area of interest intellectually, program-
ming largely left the nonstate justice sector untouched throughout the
Bush administration.
a road not taken
By far the most thoughtful and compelling attempt to constructively engage
with nonstate justice in Afghanistan was not a U.S. initiative at all. Rather it
was an initiative proposed in a major UNDP report, “Afghanistan Human
Development Report 2007.” The report forcefully advocated for a “hybrid
model of Afghan justice” that would include “the creation of cost-effective
ADR [alternative dispute resolution] and Human Rights Units alongside
the state justice system. ADR Units would be responsible for selecting ap-
propriate mechanisms to settle disputes outside the courtroom. This would
include jirgas/shuras, Community Development Councils, and other civil so-
ciety organizations. ADR mechanisms would handle minor criminal incidents
and civil cases, while giving Afghans a choice to have their cases heard at the
nearest state court. All serious criminal cases would fall exclusively within
the jurisdiction of the formal justice system. When ADR decisions are not satis-
factory to the disputants, they can be taken back to the formal, state justice sys-
tem.”120 The report, however, provoked “an angry and threatening response
from Afghan judicial and state justice institutions.”121 Given the opposition of
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key Afghan political and legal elites, it is no surprise that the hybrid model
never became ofªcial U.S. policy.
Yet, the UNDP report nonetheless proved inºuential. Ideas from the report
were selectively harnessed by policymakers for numerous initiatives, includ-
ing a series of U.S.-funded pilot programs, the Defense Department–backed
projects that used nonstate justice mechanisms for counterinsurgency dis-
cussed above, and the ºawed 2010 “Draft Law on Dispute Resolution Shura
and Jirga.”122 Each initiative, however, fell short of its goals.123 The report of-
fered a coherent policy vision, but to be implemented, let alone work effec-
tively, the proposed hybrid model required strong support from the Afghan
justice sector and the regime more generally. There would need to be a serious
commitment to building a more constructive relationship between state and
nonstate justice actors, as well as a broader commitment to reducing corrup-
tion and ending impunity. Absent these fundamental shifts, the hybrid model
had no chance of success.
a comprehensive, but inchoate approach, 2009–14
President Obama pledged to defeat the insurgency and stabilize the Afghan
state while avoiding an open-ended military commitment. Nearly all U.S. aid,
including rule-of-law assistance, emphasized these objectives. The top U.S.
military commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, argued that ef-
fective counterinsurgency involved bolstering the quality of and access to both
state and nonstate justice mechanisms “that offer swift and fair resolution of
disputes, particularly at the local level,” to disrupt the Taliban and their justice
system.124 To achieve these goals, McChrystal believed that the international
community had to “work with GIRoA [Government of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan] to develop a clear mandate and boundaries for local informal
justice systems.”125
After a comprehensive policy review, Obama ordered an “Afghanistan
surge” modeled on similar efforts to stabilize Iraq against insurgent advances.
The president authorized the deployment of 30,000 additional ground troops
to stabilize the country, but these forces would begin to be withdrawn after
eighteen months. Obama likewise dramatically increased civilian engagement
efforts, including initiatives to promote the rule of law. In addition to a vast in-
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crease in funds, the administration roughly “tripled the total U.S. government
civilian presence in Afghanistan from 300 to 1,000, overseeing additional thou-
sands of contracted civilian implementing partners.”126 It also drastically in-
creased U.S. subsidization of the state justice sector. Even after the drawdown,
funding levels for rule-of-law programs remained well above pre-2009 levels.
The administration demonstrated a willingness to try any strategy that might
help defeat the Taliban insurgency, however implausible. Despite mounting
evidence to the contrary, the United States remained wedded to the “vacuum”
theory of judicial state-building as a foundation of the U.S. government’s rule-
of-law assistance approach. For instance, the 2010 “Afghanistan and Pakistan
Regional Stabilization Strategy” emphasized that “[j]ustice and rule of law
programs will focus on creating predictable and fair dispute resolution mecha-
nisms to eliminate the vacuum that the Taliban have exploited with their own
brutal form of justice.127
The U.S. strategy was largely agnostic about whether Afghans sought jus-
tice, provided they eschewed Taliban courts. This approach to nonstate justice
displayed admirable pragmatism compared with earlier efforts that empha-
sized replicating a Western-style judiciary. Yet, this agnostic approach was un-
dermined because programs addressing the state justice system were still
trying to do exactly that. With so many moving, highly contingent, and largely
uncoordinated parts, the strategic objective was never clear. U.S. policymakers
viewed nonstate justice mechanisms as instrumentally important to their over-
arching goals of counterinsurgency and stabilization. There was never a seri-
ous attempt, however, to engage with the three main pillars of legitimacy:
cultural afªnity, Islam, and the provision of public goods, including forums for
fair and equitable dispute resolution.
simultaneous judicial state-building strategies
The Obama administration’s transformative plans for Afghanistan were crys-
tallized in the uniªed civil-military U.S. Foreign Assistance plan for 2011 to
2015.128 The plan explains, “The principal focus of the U.S. rule of law effort
is to reverse the public perception of GIRoA as weak or predatory by help-
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ing the Afghan government and local communities develop responsive and
predictable dispute resolution mechanisms that offer an alternative to the
Taliban shadow justice system. Assistance will be provided in support of
Afghan efforts to strengthen the formal state justice system, stabilize the
traditional justice system, and build a safe, secure, and humane civilian correc-
tions system.”129
Informal justice was explicitly linked to counterinsurgency efforts. The
United States wanted to collaborate with preexisting nonstate actors but also
“re-establish[] traditional dispute mechanisms” as part of broader efforts to
counter the Taliban’s parallel justice system.130 It created nonstate dispute res-
olution forums, albeit ones without long-standing cultural and religious roots.
This endeavor involved local research on nonstate systems and how they
could be utilized to defeat the Taliban. Thus, each strategy ostensibly pro-
moted goals in the legal sector, but primarily to support counterinsurg-
ency efforts.
As examined below, U.S. assistance was expanded and diversiªed to include
various strategies and engagement with both state and nonstate justice actors.
It did not, however, produce the desired results. Behind the transformative
rhetoric, the United States’ bold vision for rule-of-law assistance was under-
pinned by the following four wildly optimistic “critical assumptions.”
1. The Afghan government will implement its reinvigorated plans to ªght cor-
ruption, with measures of progress toward greater accountability.
2. Justice and rule of law programs will focus on creating predictable and fair
dispute resolution mechanisms to eliminate the vacuum that the Taliban
have exploited.
3. USG [U.S. government] programs will successfully address local ofªcials’
lack of education, experience, and limited resources.
4. GIRoA action will counter obstruction from local powerbrokers whose ac-
tivities are sometimes inconsistent with the Afghan constitution.131
Each of these assumptions was clearly unrealistic. The Karzai administra-
tion never sought to eliminate state corruption. The justice system displayed
few signs of improvement, lacked a commitment to the rule of law, and re-
mained subject to executive inºuence. As evidenced by the serious challenges
faced by well-funded U.S. programs aimed at Afghan state institutions that
placed a major emphasis on capacity building, resource restraints and lack of
knowledge were rarely the reason rule-of-law initiatives underperformed.
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Moreover, the Karzai regime and the U.S. government were in league with
powerbrokers who actively opposed advancing the rule of law. Although they
found warlords unsavory, U.S. policymakers partnered with them to try to
defeat the Taliban, and there was never a serious attempt at disarma-
ment. Afghanistan’s rule-of-law situation saw very little improvement by the
time Afghans elected a new president in 2014, in a process marked by even
greater fraud and controversy than the 2009 elections.
subsidization. In 2009, the U.S. government renewed its pledge to “sup-
port capacity development of the formal state courts.”132 The new strategy’s
core was, in reality, a supersized reincarnation of the preexisting subsidization
strategy. For example, funding from the State Department INL Bureau for rule-
of-law assistance in Afghanistan ballooned from $26.5 million in 2006 to
$328 million in 2010.133 Yet, massive funding increases failed to transform the
Afghan justice sector or even produce notable improvements. Instead, they
demonstrated the limits of what subsidization could achieve absent an ideo-
logical commitment by the state to the rule of law. As noted previously, the
Karzai regime was hostile toward efforts to strengthen the rule of law, which
could undermine both its freedom of action and its patronage system. The
Supreme Court and other key judicial organs were open to receiving aid, but
only on their terms and never in a way that ultimately threatened the over-
arching system.
harmonization. A harmonization push sought to make the nonstate jus-
tice system in Afghanistan operate on principles akin to the state system or,
more accurately, on an idealized conceptualization of state justice that protects
human rights and upholds the rule of law. It involved both supply- and
demand-side activities. On the supply side, “tribal elders/religious leaders
who conduct shuras would receive training on relevant state and religious
law.”134 On the demand side, U.S. assistance would increase Afghans’ aware-
ness regarding their legal rights and how to assert them. Assistance would
thus help align the behavior of state and nonstate actors, and bolster nonstate
actors’ willingness to support the state. There is little to suggest that U.S. initia-
tives caused Afghans to view state law more favorably or nonstate justice
mechanisms to operate more procedurally or substantively like state courts.
Neither was there any increase in the “enforcement of the rights of women and
other traditionally marginalized groups.”135 Harmonization failed because
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nonstate justice actors largely remained wary of state courts, and human rights
concerns proved readily expendable when they were seen as clashing with se-
curity and counterinsurgency goals.
bridging. Bridging between the state and nonstate justice sectors in
Afghanistan became a more prominent strategy after 2009. The United States
sought to “establish[] linkages, as appropriate, between the informal and state
systems.”136 This strategy envisioned Afghan citizens enjoying free access to
both systems as appropriate, predicated on a sensible jurisdictional divide. For
example, whereas a judge may refer a property theft to a local jirga, state
courts would retain exclusive jurisdiction over major crimes such as murder.
In reality, however, the state lacked the capacity to compel most nonstate jus-
tice actors to use state courts. The quality of state justice remained poor; thus
there was no demand. RLS-Informal witnessed no discernible increase in pop-
ular demand for state courts.137 Although aid likely increased public aware-
ness and perhaps even access, it was a proverbial bridge to nowhere as the
public demand for state justice remained sparse.
incorporation. Incorporation envisioned a partnership among the imple-
menters of U.S rule of law programs, the Afghan Ministry of Justice, and other
relevant agencies “to formalize links between the two systems [state and
nonstate justice] to maximize the beneªts of both systems and to reduce the
weaknesses.”138 These ambitious ideals were prominent in the 2009 draft
nonstate justice policy, which was promoted and signed by various state repre-
sentatives and international backers. Although it recognized the potential ben-
eªts of nonstate justice, the policy demanded that “informal dispute resolution
decisions need to be consistent with Shariah, the Constitution, other Afghan
laws and international human rights standards.”139 The policy consensus was
shallow, however. There was minimal consultation with tribal nonstate justice
actors, and no clear vision existed as to how to address the de facto authority
of warlords in the areas they controlled.
The September 2010 “Draft Law on Dispute Resolution Shuras and Jirgas”
imagined nonstate justice actors as part of the state system. Consequently, it
heavily regulated their jurisdiction, operations, and decisionmaking as well as
their relationship to state courts.140 As such, the draft law included harmoniza-
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tion and bridging elements alongside incorporation. The law staunchly as-
serted the state’s authority to control and regulate all aspects of nonstate
dispute resolution. In addition, it stipulated that jirga participants “and parties
of dispute shall be duty bound to observe provisions of this law” or face crimi-
nal charges, even though jirgas were only empowered to hear civil disputes
and petty juvenile crimes on referral.141 Jirgas and shuras could not “make de-
cisions that violate human rights of parties in dispute, especially of women
and children,” and all judgments would have been subject to appeal to state
courts.142 The law was not passed, however, having met ªerce opposition from
the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and the Human Rights Commission, which
feared that it would lend credibility to “traditional” dispute resolution,
which they view as antithetical to human rights standards and women’s
rights.143 The state was open to engagement with the nonstate justice sec-
tors but only on its own, stark terms. The central government’s internal divi-
sions ultimately prevented the law from being promulgated. Even if a law had
been enacted, it is unlikely to have meaningfully altered the operation of
dispute resolution at the local level given the weakness of state authority in
many areas.
repression. Afghan state and international forces sought to shake and un-
dermine the Taliban justice system. At the same time, these actors realized that
the popular appeal of Taliban justice constituted a profound challenge to state
authority. Although rule-of-law programs were not trying to destroy the
Taliban system and eliminate its core personnel, with the partial exception of
ROLFF-A, they aimed to undermine the system’s appeal. Doing so proved re-
markably difªcult, however, because the state system remained unappealing.
By the end of 2014, it was clear that Taliban justice was a major and growing
feature of the Afghan legal landscape.
Learning from Lessons Not Learned
Advancing the rule of law in Afghanistan presented a daunting challenge re-
gardless of policy decisions undertaken by the United States. Yet, state-build-
ing efforts in Afghanistan started optimistically. The Taliban regime wilted
away with minimal resistance. The new, multi-ethnic state under President
Karzai had a real opportunity to demonstrate that it was a legitimate govern-
ing entity.144 That opportunity was squandered, but it was squandered as a re-
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sult of domestic and international policy choices. The Afghan state now faces a
crisis of legitimacy and a powerful insurgency that promises the law and order
the state has failed to provide, but to cast that outcome as inevitable serves to
excuse bad policy and invites future disasters. Afghanistan is not alone. Ad-
vancing the rule of law after conºict will constitute a major foreign policy chal-
lenge for the foreseeable future. As extensive legal pluralism characterizes
many societies, particularly conºict-prone ones, future interventions and sub-
sequent efforts to advance the rule of law will almost certainly occur in places
marked by a high degree of legal pluralism, such as Yemen or Syria. As a re-
sult, Afghanistan offers a rich source of insights for helping to ensure that
future judicial state-building endeavors do not simply replicate the same mis-
takes as U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.
a stitch in time . . .
Afghanistan’s own history shows that a viable, legitimate order was certainly
a possibility. Before the late 1970s communist coup, the country had enjoyed
decades of domestic tranquility. In the 1990s, the Taliban itself had previously
established a monopoly on the use of force under even more chaotic condi-
tions. After the end of Taliban rule in 2001, Afghanistan enjoyed relative peace
before violence began to rapidly metastasize, and ªghting constituted “a full-
blown insurgency by 2006.”145 Moreover, Afghanistan’s population has cer-
tainly demonstrated capacity for violence. At the same time, they prize order,
as evidenced by the paramount role of Pashtunwali and other nonstate dispute
resolution systems, and by widespread acceptance of a national state for centu-
ries, albeit a limited one. Thus, rather than bemoan the country’s hopelessness,
it is important to critically examine how Afghanistan rule-of-law assistance
and broader U.S. policy could have been undertaken more effectively.
At the onset of post-conºict reconstruction efforts, international actors have
maximum inºuence and the broadest range of feasible options.146 The state ju-
dicial sector in Afghanistan faced major entrenched challenges, including min-
imal infrastructure, serious human resources shortfalls, dubious legitimacy,
and skepticism from the nonstate authorities that oversaw most local dispute
resolution. There was a clear, constructive opportunity for international assis-
tance to help address these issues. As the lead nation, however, Italy did little
until 2003 and then achieved little until it was relieved of those duties in 2006.
Italy’s performance has been rightly criticized, but the loss of this window of
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opportunity was not solely Italy’s fault. The United States decided to topple
the Taliban and was by far the most dominant international player in deter-
mining policy afterward. Italy’s lead-nation status was not inevitable or even
particularly logical, but rather a reºection of the U.S. policy of outsourcing to
other nations as many aspects of state-building as it could during the crucial
early period.
establishing the foundation
State legitimacy and institutional arrangements are vital for the development
of the rule of law. International rule-of-law assistance is almost invariably me-
diated through state institutions and ofªcials, even when targeting nonstate
actors. It matters immensely whether the state is seen as legitimate and
whether those entrusted with the state’s authority care about promoting a
state bound by the rule of law. As noted earlier, President Karzai’s regime was
decidedly disinterested in the rule of law and opposed meaningful efforts to
advance it. In general, policymakers should be deeply skeptical of the assur-
ances of corrupt rulers with authoritarian tendencies.
The international community also bears responsibility for aiding and abet-
ting Afghanistan’s governance disaster. The rule of law is tightly linked to
democratic accountability. The legal order is inexorably interconnected with a
state’s political institutions.147 In theory, the “rule of law may exist without
democratic forms of political will formation,” but on “empirical grounds”
the rule of law has been inexorably linked with democratic government.148
Democratic rule does not inevitably produce the rule of law. Nevertheless, de-
mocracy appears to be a functional prerequisite.149 As Guillermo O’Donnell
highlights, “Only under a democratic rule of law will the various agencies of
electoral, societal, and horizontal accountability function effectively, without
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obstruction and intimidation from powerful state actors.”150 In the early
years, the international community exercised meaningful inºuence over the
development of the nascent Afghan state’s institutional structure. Interna-
tional backing secured the top state post for Karzai initially and encouraged
the president’s concentration of power. Once entrenched, this institutional ar-
rangement proved resistant to change. Individuals who reach the top spot ªrst
have a disproportionate advantage going forward and can use their position to
undermine future democratic competition.151 International actors need to be
cautious with their support. They must also push for institutional mechanisms
such as free elections, political parties, and political accountability mecha-
nisms to ensure that the people themselves have a real decision regarding who
leads their country.
As the United States viewed security as its top priority in Afghanistan from
the very start, concern about the rule of law often fell to the background.
Thus, the United States’ ability to promote the rule of law has been heavily cir-
cumscribed by its entrenched commitment to the regime and an emphasis on
security over justice. Karzai’s administration sought to retain power and ex-
ercise authority unconstrained by law. In contrast, both Bush and Obama ad-
ministration policymakers wanted an Afghan liberal democratic polity that
embraced the rule of law, but they consistently compromised that aspiration.
The Karzai regime recognized that U.S. policymakers believed that the state-
building project in Afghanistan could not be seen to fail, and that to admit that
it was failing would have risked being seen as tacit acceptance of a Taliban vic-
tory. Over time, the Afghan state’s endemic, profound weakness gave the re-
gime a greater ability to operate with independence from its international
backers as the prospect of a Taliban victory became increasingly plausible.
Democracy and the rule of law demand more than free-and-fair elections,
but electoral integrity is a prerequisite. Although U.S. policymakers expressed
concerns about Afghan electoral processes, particularly after the initial presi-
dential election in 2004, they never pushed to ensure credible elections. Fraud
was perpetrated on an industrial scale in every election after 2004.152 Yet each
time, U.S. ofªcials expressed concerns only after the event, when it was too
late to take serious action. They also did little as Karzai’s regime systematically
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sought to undermine the existence of political parties that could form the insti-
tutional bases for aggregating social interests, and the regime methodically
compromised the integrity of voting registration, oversight, and administra-
tion processes.153 U.S. commitments to promoting the rule of law cannot be
effective or credible when democracy is not a policy priority.
rethinking aid domestically and internationally
Rule-of-law assistance in Afghanistan was problematic both in how it was im-
plemented and how it was structured bureaucratically. With regard to imple-
mentation, U.S. efforts reºected fundamental failures of timing, coordination,
and strategy. Assistance was scarce during the crucial early interval and then
was focused on unneeded and unwanted legislative reforms.154 Once funding
began to dramatically increase, there was no plausible strategy as to how the
assistance would actually advance the rule of law. Worse, once it became clear
that subsidization was facilitating state corruption rather combating it, aid
was not reconsidered, reallocated, or halted. Subsidization efforts continued
and expanded with no realistic vision for how assistance could be improved.
Even today, U.S. ofªcials show little interest in changing their approach to
dealing with institutions decidedly disinterested in the rule of law. The latest
USAID rule-of-law program, known as “Adalat,” has as a major goal “com-
batting corruption by empowering relevant Afghan Government agencies/
institutions.”155 The irony is presumably unintentional. Although implement-
ers receive the most scrutiny, this perverse incentive structure is fundamen-
tally a policymaking issue. Most nongovernmental organizations must
respond to donor-established incentives to survive.156
Operationally, program coordination remained consistently abysmal from
2004 to 2014. Even prior to the dramatic increase in rule-of-law expenditures
under Obama’s Afghan surge, the U.S. State Department Ofªce of Inspector
General admitted that there was “no way to readily identify ROL [rule of law]
funding and subsequently to identify duplicate programs, overlapping pro-
grams, or programs conºicting with each other.”157 Massive funding increases
exacerbated these long-standing issues. It was unclear even how many pro-
grams there were or how much money had been spent.158 Throughout the
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period of U.S. engagement examined here, program strategy, implementa-
tion, and coordination problems were always being addressed but were
never solved.
These programming issues reºect larger, more profound problems within
the U.S. international assistance bureaucracy. U.S. donors, particularly USAID,
demand extensive control over the scope, content, and implementation of pro-
jects they support. This level of micromanagement was an especially bad ªt for
Afghanistan given the ºuidity of the situation and the need for a nuanced,
localized approach. If programs are supposed to be dynamic, there needs to
be ºexibility and an understanding that calculated risks are sometimes neces-
sary. There also needs to be a willingness to halt program activities that are
not working or end partnerships with interlocutors that lack meaningful in-
terest in promoting the rule of law. Currently, programs that fail to execute
are viewed poorly by donors and endanger future contracts. Program im-
plementers thus have strong incentives to collaborate with deeply corrupt
state institutions.
The existing operational structure means that donors can design the pro-
gram and continually display an almost willful blindness to political reality in
the recipient country. The contracting system is not without signiªcant ºaws.
Nevertheless, by deªnition the contractors’ job is simply to follow USAID’s di-
rectives.159 More generally, this dynamic institutionalizes an unaccountability
loop whereby donors can blame contractors when programs go awry, while
contractors can claim that they were simply following donor instructions.
Although admittedly a somewhat remote prospect, ªxing this dynamic will re-
quire that Congress adopts a more nuanced understanding of how develop-
ment assistance works and under what circumstances it can be most effective.
engaging justice holistically
As with most conºict-prone states, nonstate justice mechanisms still handle
the vast majority of disputes in Afghanistan. U.S. policymakers belatedly rec-
ognized nonstate justice as a major pillar of Afghanistan’s legal order, but they
never seriously engaged nonstate justice as a preexisting structure or an inde-
pendent source of legitimate authority. Instead, preferred local interlocutors
were labeled the key nonstate justice actors, independent of their actual social
standing, and then bolstered through military force and outside funds. As
Thomas Johnson and Chris Mason write, successful policy engagement with
the nonstate justice system of Pashtunwali demands, at a minimum, “an un-
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derstanding of the core principles of this cultural value system.”160 While rule-
of-law programs researched local areas, outputs were ªxed and unrelated to
local realities because counterinsurgency was always the paramount goal.
The uneven results in Afghanistan also seriously challenge the dominant
U.S. counterinsurgency view that holds that “establishing the rule of law is a
key goal and end state.”161 Although the rule of law is certainly worthy as
both, it takes decades and is invariably rooted in domestic politics.162 Thus, it
is a long-term goal. Moreover, the rule of law cannot be promoted successfully
absent powerful domestic constituencies and at least some high-level state of-
ªcials who take the idea seriously. International rule-of-law efforts, whether
geared toward counterinsurgency or simply trying to improve the quality and
effectiveness of state courts, have a limited scope absent a state commitment to
be bound by the law. Aid can easily become another source of rent extraction
for a rentier state.163
Conclusion
Despite Afghanistan’s immense importance to U.S. foreign policy for more
than a decade, rule-of-law assistance has often been ad hoc, ineffective, and
predicated on widely optimistic assumptions. At worst, it has helped enable
predatory state practices. The vast majority of aid served to prop up funda-
mentally compromised institutions, while democracy was jettisoned in pursuit
of security and little thought was given to the constructive engagement of the
tribal and religious actors who have long formed crucial pillars of legal legiti-
macy. International actors accepted the Karzai regime’s increasing dependence
on warlords who lacked any interest in the rule of law. Over time, the Taliban
and its justice system grew in strength and popular legitimacy, in large part
as a response to the Karzai regime’s corruption and reliance on warlords.
International interest in engagement with the nonstate justice sector, how-
ever, was focused primarily on counterinsurgency rather than justice. U.S.
assistance ultimately produced few beneªts and, in certain instances, was
even counterproductive.
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The situation in Afghanistan should not be taken as an invitation to nihil-
ism, however. Afghanistan may be a case study in how many things can go
wrong in post-conºict state-building, but it crucially reºects policy decisions.
Different decisions may well have produced more positive results. Taking de-
mocracy and legitimate governance seriously is a crucial ªrst step. Policy-
makers and aid implementers need a realistic and compelling strategic vision
rooted in a deep understanding of a country’s legal culture, politics, and his-
tory. Prompt action must then be taken to advance that vision. Finally, realistic
expectations are essential, as developing the rule of law is a long-term process.
Policymakers can beneªt from being better able to conceptualize and respond
to the challenges posed by judicial state-building in a legally pluralist society,
such as Afghanistan. The United States never truly sought to engage with
nonstate justice as a means to promote a more just legal order in Afghanistan,
but rather saw nonstate actors as mere cogs in a deeply ºawed counterinsur-
gency approach. Counterfactuals are always fraught. Still, given the wide-
spread desire for a more just legal order and Afghanistan’s history of state,
tribal, and religious collaboration, a more constructive relationship was cer-
tainly possible and likely remains so today. Savvy strategic planning and prag-
matic adaptation can improve state-building and rule of law efforts in
Afghanistan and elsewhere, but it will require tough choices and occasionally
even rethinking the provision of aid.
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